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The post-cold war era presented security challenges that at one level are a continuation of the 
cold war era; at another level, these phenomena manifested in new forms. Whether the issues 
of economics and trade, transfer of technologies, challenges of intervention, or humanitarian 
crisis, the countries of the South (previously pejoratively labelled “Third World” or “developing” 
countries) have continued to address these challenges within the framework of their capabilities 
and concerns. The volume explores defence diplomacies, national security challenges and 
strategies, dynamics of diplomatic manoeuvers and strategic resource management of Latin 
American, southern African and Asian countries.
This path-breaking work is a fresh addition to the comparative literature on defence and security 
studies that links concepts and cases, giving voice to scholars related to the Global South and not 
to the Western powers. Emphasising history, political economy, the military, (human) security and 
politics, contributors to this innovative volume demonstrate ‘how the past reappears because 
it is a hidden present’, to paraphrase novelist Octavio Paz. A capita selecta of case studies and 
dialogue engendered thereby hold much promise for academic researchers, theorists, expert 
practitioners, security and political practitioners, policymakers and students. Apart from 
comparative potential, the analyses reflect a purposeful blend of theory, history and substance 
– indeed a worthy and valuable venture in current times. 
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Venezuela’s Defence Diplomacy 




Between the 1950s and the late 1980s, Venezuela’s economy and welfare attracted many migrants. An economic crisis, 
subsequent mass uprising and riots, and brutal repression by the armed forces was a watershed. Mid‑career officers conspired; 
one of them, Hugo Chávez, a Lieutenant‑Colonel staged a coup that failed (1992). Imprisoned and amnestied, he founded a 
political movement, won the presidential elections and took office in 1999.
Chávez and Castro became revolutionary brothers‑in‑arms. Venezuela supported Cuba by subsidised oil, Cuba provided 
military and intelligence experts, and medical and literacy personnel on a massive scale, around 50,000 in 2013. Chávez 
launched an extraordinary pro‑poor reform programme, the ‘socialism of the twentieth century’. Meanwhile, he strengthened 
the armed forces both numerically and budgetarily, buying Russian and Chinese equipment. He also created militias of armed 
civilians up to 365,000 members. 
Gradually the military occupied more strategic positions as cabinet ministers or supervisors of state institutions. Chávez 
death in 2013 coincided with the fall of the oil prices, dramatic budget cuts, mass demonstrations, and mass outmigration, 
in the context of a galloping inflation and a polarised society. His successor Maduro governs by decree (there are two 
contending parliaments) and turned nearly all significant cabinet and top administrative positions in the public sector and the 
nationalised economy to the military, his staunch allies. 
Introduction: Venezuela’s natural resources under previous 
governments 
Venezuela has the second largest oil deposits in the world, owns huge gas reserves, and 
has the second largest hydropower facilities in Latin America. For almost the entire 
twentieth century, Venezuela was blessed with abundant natural resources that enriched 
the national elite and a growing middle-class population. Oil was discovered in the 1920s, 
and in the first three decades after World War II, the booming oil prices made Venezuela 
a wealthy country. From the 1950s to the early 1980s, Venezuela’s economy experienced 
consistent growth, and the country enjoyed one of  highest standards of  living in Latin 
America, attracting many migrants. Particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, oil revenues 
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guaranteed generous public spending on welfare programmes, health care and education, 
and food and transport subsidies. Venezuela was also one of  the founding members of  the 
Organization of  the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). In 1976, the oil industry was 
nationalised and by 1980 the new conglomerate, Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA), was 
the third largest oil company in the world after the purchase of  refineries in the United 
States (US) and Europe. 
From the late 1950s onwards, Venezuela had a bipartisan political system, the result, 
after a period of  dictatorship, of  a pact between two parties: Acción Democrática (AD), a 
social democratic party with a strong labour base; and the Comité de Organización Electoral 
Independiente (COPEI), a centre-right Christian Democratic party. For 40 years, they largely 
alternated office, but in the late 1980s this political structure deteriorated, as a result of 
internal leadership disputes and widespread corruption amongst public officials (Levine, 
2002). The political decline was accompanied by a collapse of  world oil prices, a process 
of  devaluation and double-digit inflation (84% in 1989 and 99% in 1996). 
An IMF-assisted adjustment programme, launched by government technocrats as shock 
therapy for the economy, prompted mass uprising and riots in the country’s capital 
Caracas, which were repressed by the armed forces (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018:5). This 
so-called ‘Caracazo’, with a death toll of  at least 500 citizens, was a watershed event. 
The advent of Chávez 
Venezuelan mid-career officers, members of  a group called COMACATE (in English: 
Comandantes [Lieutenant-Colonels], Mayors, Captains and Lieutenants) began to 
conspire against the government and planned a reformist coup. There were also other 
parallel military opposition groups, one of  which was headed by Hugo Chávez, then a 
Lieutenant-Colonel who, along with his brothers-in-arms, formed a clandestine movement 
(MBR-200) and staged a failed coup in 1992. He received only a light prison sentence 
and he retained a considerable popularity as someone who had stood up to government 
corruption. After his release, he founded another political movement with a programme 
of  social reforms and presented himself  as a presidential candidate. 
After his release from jail, he was discreetly monitored by Cuban diplomats. When he 
launched his new movement and campaigned in the slums and rural villages, they were 
impressed by the adoration he attracted, and when they heard religious villagers saying, 
“The Messiah has come, I want to touch the Messiah”, they were convinced that Chávez 
would be the next Venezuelan president. His campaign for social and economic reforms 
won him the favour of  both the rural poor and urban slum dwellers, the working class 
and the impoverished middle classes. When he wanted to visit Cuba, he was told that 
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“Cuba not even could buy him a matchbox” and he bought his own ticket. When the 
plane landed, Fidel Castro greeted him as if  he already were a Chief  of  State. It was the 
beginning of  a special bond: Fidel the wise old mentor, Chávez his young revolutionary 
successor and colleague. 
Chávez was not the first revolutionary Venezuelan military president. In 1958, after the 
overthrow of  Venezuelan dictator Pérez Jimenez and before the bipartisan pact between 
AD and COPEI, leftist Rear Admiral Wolfgang Larrazábal became interim president. He 
sent a large stock of  weapons to Castro’s Rebel Army in December 1958, when they were 
at the brink of  victory. Similarly, Chávez was a life-long devotee of  Simon Bolívar and 
admirer of  leftist military reformists Velasco (in Peru, 1968-195) and Torrijos (in Panama, 
1968-1981), and he built on their legacy. Bolivar, Velasco, and Torrijos believed in the ideal 
of  an indivisible unity between people and the army, and identified themselves as military 
reformers with a special calling to break the power of  the economic and political oligarchy, 
restore national control over the economy, and carry out social reforms, implemented by 
the Armed Forces. Their public discourses and they are basically identical: soldiers of  poor 
descent, familiar with poverty, educated within the army which let them grow beyond 
their expectations, extremely loyal to the armed institution, and acting as structural 
reformers for the benefit of  the poor and underprivileged. However, Chávez was the 
most outspoken and emphasised the role of  the military as the vanguard of  his future 
revolutionary process. In his own words: ‘We can say that it is like the formula of  water: 
H2O. If  we say that the people are the oxygen, the armed force is the hydrogen. Water 
doesn’t exist without hydrogen’ (Bilbao, 2002:28-29). The new president decided to trust 
his loyal brothers-in-arms and other military senior officers.
He campaigned as a presidential candidate against the two existing but disintegrating 
political parties (Carnevali, 2014), and won the elections in 1998. In 1999, he organised a 
Constituent Assembly where he obtained a large majority. He later won three consecutive 
presidential elections: in 2000 (with 60%), 2006 (with 63%) and 2012 (with 55%).
Like Simon Bolivar, the national and Latin American hero of  the War of  Independence, 
Chávez envisioned a ‘civil-military alliance’. Before Chávez’s presidency, the Venezuelan 
military was constitutionally restricted to safeguarding public security and protecting the 
national territory. They could not vote in elections and were not expected to participate 
in public debates. The new Chávez Constitution drastically changed the role of  the armed 
forces, turning it into an instrument of  national development and a service provider 
to the poor and underprivileged. His initial political movement, and later the United 
Socialist Party of  Venezuela (Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela, PSUV), was built on the 
sympathy and the loyal votes of  the poor classes of  society; by the time he took in office 
in 1999, approximately half  the population lived below the poverty line (ECLAC, 2001:44). 
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He also received support from grassroots organisations that emerged during his presidency, 
and more than 30,000 ‘communal councils’ (consejos comunales in Spanish), elected by the 
community to initiate and oversee local activities and policies. 
However, there was also growing opposition from military elites, and segments of  the 
middle- and upper-classes. In 2002, Chávez survived an attempted military coup, and a 
failed general strike, organised by a heterogeneous alliance of  military and opposition 
party leaders, which left the already-divided political opposition discredited. As a result, 
Chávez purged the higher military echelons, and loyalty to the president and the ‘Bolivarian 
Revolution’ became a career requirement. 
The Venezuelan armed forces under Chávez
The Venezuelan Armed Forces have four branches: the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, 
and the National Guard (a kind of  militarised police). These were renamed the “National 
Bolivarian Armed Force” (FANB, Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana in Spanish). Gradually, 
the FANB became the executive instrument of  the charismatic President-Comandante, 
who had organised his sympathisers into a political party, militias, trade unions, and 
neighbourhood associations. The higher echelons of  the military and the mid-ranking 
officers became part of  the transformed army, used as a state-building institution and the 
right arm of  the president. The nationalist-leftist ideology of  the ‘military as guardians of 
the nation’, acting for the benefit of  the entire nation, especially the poor, contributed to 
their institutional status. Since the beginning of  the Chavez’s presidency, the armed forces 
had been used for civil tasks, and this role was later expanded, such as in the management 
of  gigantic housing projects and other infrastructural provisions.
The appointment of  the military to management positions in these projects, the admini-
stration, and the nationalised economy helped to increase their loyalty to the president, 
who styled himself  as following in the footsteps of  Bolivar. It also helped that military 
salaries were increased, and that lower-class popular access to the military and militias 
was encouraged. After the removal of  adversaries within the armed forces after the failed 
coup of  2002, Chávez rapidly promoted loyal non-commissioned officers to officers and 
mid-career officers to top jobs, and members of  the armed forces were permitted to vote 
in elections.
Between 2008 and 2015, the armed force’s budget grew from 1.06% to 4.61% of  the GDP, 
while military personnel increased from 117,400 in 2010 to 197,744 in 2014 (from 40 to 
63  per  10,000 citizens). In 2015, the number of  militias was 365,046, organised in 100 
‘integral defence areas’ (RESDAL, 2016:210-215; Jácome, 2018). Chávez named these 
popular auxiliary forces the ‘People-in-Arms’ (Pueblo en Armas) to emphasise the bond 
between the armed forces and the civilian population. 
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Venezuela’s sources of  weaponry changed over time. At first, Chávez tried to match the 
much-larger armed forces of  Colombia (around 400,000 effectives due to its ‘internal 
armed conflict’) by buying sophisticated Russian equipment especially for the Venezuelan 
air force and navy. In later years, that was complemented by Chinese multipurpose 
airplanes. He also tried to acquire Brazilian and Spanish aircraft and French submarines, 
but US pressure prevented the delivery (IISS, 2009:57-58). In 2005, Chávez also signed 
a contract with Russia for the assembly of  Kalashnikov assault rifles, ammunition and 
drones for popular defence purposes, in the case of  a US invasion. As long as world oil 
prices were high, the Venezuelan government heavily invested in weaponry. 
Socialism of the 21st century, Cuba and petro-diplomacy
In the first ten years of  Chávez’s presidency, he expanded on his notion of  ‘socialism of 
the 21st century’. World oil prices were booming, and the oil revenues were the basis 
for an extensive redistribution programme. Chávez’s socialism consisted of  extensive 
nationalisation and expropriation, more than 20 major social and economic reforms, new 
political structures, the incorporation of  the army as an executive body, and a charismatic 
President-Comandante. He launched a large series of  domestic social and economic 
‘missions’, headed by trusted military personnel and civilians, in the process creating a 
system of  presidential ministers and cabinet members who depended directly on the 
president’s orders. 
Research NGO Transparencia Venezuela worked out that, of  all 526 Venezuelan state-owned 
enterprises, 74% were nationalised or expropriated under presidents Chávez and Maduro. 
Oil giant PDVSA, nationalised in 1975 and extended to a conglomerate of  interlinked 
corporations, became the financial draft horse of  the reforms, while the nationalisation 
of  banks facilitated financial control by the government. In 2003, a policy was issued 
on foreign exchange and on consumer prices in the hands of  the state (Transparencia 
Venezuela, 2017:3-4, 12, 32).
After 2002, Castro provided Chávez with Cuban bodyguards, as in the case of  Allende 
in the early 1970s. Chávez also began to arm civilian militias as had been done in Cuba, 
where militias had been created immediately before the Bay of  Pigs invasion in order to 
prevent domestic difficulties or counter an invasion by foreign mercenaries or soldiers. 
In later years, the Cuban and Venezuelan security apparatus reached an agreement of 
mutual cooperation, enabling operations in one another’s territory.
Chávez and Castro built a relationship as two equal partners with Venezuela as financier, 
which became a mutually beneficial agreement: Cuban doctors, literacy trainers and 
educational experts went to Venezuela, while Cuba received generous oil deliveries at 
preferential rates. In 2013, the year of  Chávez’s death, around 50,000 Cuban teachers, 
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literacy experts, university professors, doctors, dentists, paramedical personnel and other 
experts were employed in Venezuela. Chávez also became the financier of  a network of 
like-minded Latin American countries, the ALBA countries (Bolivarian Alliance for the 
Peoples of  Our America): with Bolivia (2006), Nicaragua (2007), Ecuador (2009) and six 
Caribbean island-states, with Surinam and Haiti receiving observer status. Honduras’s 
affiliation in 2009 was prevented by a military coup.
The Cuban and Venezuelan leaders considered a kind of  further political unification, with 
Cuba’s Vice-President of  the Council of  State in 2005 claiming that, “there was only one 
country with two presidents”. In 2007, Chávez launched the idea of  a Cuban-Venezuelan 
confederation: ‘In the near future we, Cuba and Venezuela, could perfectly establish a 
confederation of  republics: one confederation, two republics in one, two countries in 
one.’1 However, Venezuela and Cuba had two decidedly different economies and political 
structures, and Venezuela’s was already strongly polarised. As a result, the project was 
never realised.
The Cuban-Venezuelan health programme and the many other missions initiated in those 
first years were a great success, giving Chávez huge popularity. Undeniably, the quality 
of  life for the poorer people of  Venezuela greatly improved during the first ten years of 
his presidency (ECLAC, 2017:47, 50). According to the Venezuelan Institute of  statistics 
(INE), the poverty percentage decreased from 44% in 1999 to 27% in 2010.
Chávez’s foreign policy was aimed at a Latin American integration policy that was not 
dominated by the US. He was one of  the main architects of  a new hemispheric integration 
model, with the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) in 2004, the Union of  South 
American Nations (UNASUR) in 2008, and the Community of  Latin American and 
Caribbean States (Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños, CELAC) in 2012. 
These organisations were created to bypass US and OAS political and military influence, 
and to exclude those Caribbean islands with US or European statehood. Most of  the 
ideological underpinning was a fervent pro-poor, pro-socialist and ‘Our America’ discourse, 
accompanied by vitriolic anti-US rhetoric.
There is good reason to use the term ‘petro-diplomacy’ (coined by Clem & Maingot, 2011) 
when discussing Venezuelan foreign policy. Financial support was given from Venezuelan 
oil revenues or on the basis of  highly favourable oil-supply programmes, like PetroCaribe, 
PetroSur, PetroNica and PetroAndina. Chávez was an important contributor to institutions 
like the Forum of  São Paolo, founded in 1990 by Lula and Castro, that comprises more 
than 100 organisations and movements, and he also co-financed the World Social Forum, 
a Brazilian initiative created in 2001. In 2003, Castro and Chávez initiated the Network of 
Intellectuals and Artists in Defence of  Humanity, presided over by Mexican sociologist 
Pablo González Casanova. 
I. Liebenberg, D. Kruijt & S. Paranjpe (eds). 2020. Defence Diplomacy and National Security Strategy. Stellenbosch: African Sun Media.
https://doi.org/10.18820/9781928480556/05 Copyright 2020 African Sun Media and the authors
93Venezuela’s Defence Diplomacy under Chávez and Maduro (1999‑2018) 
However, with respect to Chávez’s domestic policy, while poverty and income inequality 
declined, urban crime grew. Between 1999 and 2010, the number of  murders per 100.000 
inhabitants increased from 25 to 57, and this is at least partly due to radical changes in the 
institutional order. The new government encouraged land invasions, the establishment 
of  a new social order destabilised the existing institutions of  law and order: a new 
criminal legislation curtailed the role of  the police, there were public conflicts between 
the president and the armed forces during the failed coup in 2002, conflicts with the 
old political structures, and half-hearted government action against armed gangs in 
communities (Briceño-León & Camardiel, 2015). 
Along with this, political opposition proliferated. A divided segment of  the two former 
political powers (AD and COPEI), as well as 18 smaller opposition parties of  all political 
orientations, formed the Democratic Unity Roundtable (Mesa de la Unidad Democrática, 
MUD) in 2009. In June 2009, former social democratic politician Antonio Ledezma was 
elected as Mayor of  Caracas and re-elected in 2013. The onset of  an economic recession, 
double-digit inflation, increasing levels of  poverty and insecurity, and reports of  corruption 
affected Chávez’s popularity in his last years, but did not stop him from winning an 
electoral victory just before his death. However, under the presidency of  his successor 
Maduro, the problems multiplied exponentially.
Maduro’s Venezuela (2013-2018)
Nicolás Maduro, son of  a prominent union leader and later a union leader himself, 
followed cadre courses in Cuba and was a loyal ‘Chavista’. He made a career under Chávez 
as President of  the National Assembly, Minister of  Foreign Affairs, Vice President and, 
after Chávez’s death, as Interim President. He won the presidency in 2013 with a narrow 
majority, and was soon confronted by a deep economic malaise, conflicting power blocs 
within the governing PSUV, and growing popularity of  his political opponents.
In the last quarter of  2013, Venezuela’s economy entered a recession, and in 2014, world 
oil prices fell dramatically. The government’s course of  action was monetary financing. 
Venezuela became heavily indebted to Russia and China, and the ‘parallel dollar’ (the 
price setting of  nearly all consumer goods) went up explosively. Analysts can only use 
estimates because the Central Bank has not published inflation statistics since 2015, but 
most foreign analysts describe the Venezuelan economy at present (May 2019) as in free-
fall or meltdown with an inflation rate of  815,194 percent. The circulation of  cash is 
restricted, and there is an acute shortness of  essential goods and services, particularly 
medicine and food.
The social and political divide in Venezuela, already visible during Chávez’s last years, 
became catastrophic under Maduro’s presidency, resulting in opposition marches and 
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wide-spread discontent. However, the opposition MUD is also internally divided. The most 
government-friendly sector wants clean elections and the release of  political prisoners, 
others would welcome a coup by the armed forces, while the most radical wing would 
opt for an invasion by the US.
When the crisis started to impact the daily budget and national diet, Maduro’s government 
organised a new clientelist instrument, Comités Locales De Abastecimiento y Producción 
(CLAP), local production and distribution committees who provide a three-weekly food 
package per household. It is a national programme that sustains the core of  the Maduro 
vote. In 2014, only 8% of  Venezuelans received a package, but this had jumped to 28% by 
2016, while structural poverty escalated to 38% in 2016 (ENCOVI, 2017). It is generally 
agreed that by August 2018, poverty had reached the same percentage (around 50%) as 
when Chávez took office. The ‘Carnet de la Patria’ (Certificate of  the Fatherland) and 
CLAP are the new political loyalty programmes of  the government, and the food packages 
are distributed by the military or the local party representatives (López Maya, 2018:69).
Since 2014, the number of  Venezuelan migrants seeking refuge in Latin America, the 
US and Spain has grown (Freier, 2018), although the exact amounts are hard to ascertain. 
According to UNHCR and OIM data, 328,888 official asylum-seekers and other legal 
migrants had left Venezuela by 31 August 2014, the asylum-seekers predominantly to 
Peru, the US, Brazil and Spain, the other legal migrants principally to Colombia, Chile, 
Ecuador and Argentina. However, that is only the tip of  the iceberg, and Venezuelan 
scholars estimate that the exodus already numbers between three and three and a half 
million Venezuelans, predominantly economic migrants (May 2019). The first wave was 
the academic brain-drain: engineers, doctors, architects, and other professionals. After 
this, mass migration increased. 
Corruption and crime also increased, particularly in Caracas, the larger cities and the long 
border region with Colombia, where violent non-state actors operate, such as former 
guerrilla units, drug gangs and armed criminals. It is widely-known that of  the 50 most 
lethal cities of  300,000 inhabitants or more in the world in 2016, 42 are located in Latin 
America, and Caracas is the most violent city of  all, with 130 assassinations per 100,000 
inhabitants (Seguridad, Justicia y Paz, 2017). 
Researchers have noted the nebulous or non-existent government publications about 
crime and crime statistics and, in 2015 and 2016, two renowned scholars published on 
the structural character of  corruption in the country, drawing attention to the large 
Colombian and Venezuelan criminal and drug networks (Tablante & Tarre 2015; 2016). 
Journalists and academic researchers can only speculate about the extent of  illegal import 
and export of  drugs and valuables, gold and capital, but there are strong indications that 
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Rampa 4, the government airfield, is a site from which gold, monetary instruments and 
stockpiles of  cash are transferred to accounts at foreign banks in Europe and Panama, or as 
deposits for residences and other properties in foreign countries (Briceño Torrealba, 2016). 
The researchers also highlighted substantial corruption within the oil giant, PDVSA, and 
other state-owned enterprises, such as production and distribution consortium, Pdval 
(Tablante & Tarre, 2016:104ff., 168ff.). 
In information about the 526 state-owned or nationalised companies, only 21% of  the 
shareholder structure, 6% of  the names of  the board members, and 24% of  the names 
of  the CEOs have been published, and of  the identified CEOs, 30% are active duty or 
retired military (Transparencia Venezuela, 2017:8). The military oversee and administer 
CLAP, and also manage the entire electrical and hydro-power sector, the Metro of  Caracas, 
and the Corporación Venezolana de Guyana, the source of  nearly all national natural 
and mineral resources. Additionally, they operate the entrepreneurial industrial complex 
associated with the Ministry of  Defence (Ramos Pismarato, 2018:271ff.). 
Along with this, Maduro governs by decree, supported unconditionally by the upper 
echelons of  the armed forces. In early 2015, the Mayor of  Caracas, Ledezma, was detained 
on charges of  supporting an attempted coup, then put under house arrest, confined again, 
and again put under house arrest. In November 2017, he fled to Spain where he received 
political asylum. In December 2015, the united opposition MUD won the parliamentary 
elections with 56% of  the vote, and in response, Maduro by decree organised the election 
of  a Constituent Assembly in June 2017. The MUD parties boycotted the elections and the 
governing PSUV won a massive victory in the absence of  rivals. At present, the Constituent 
Assembly ‘cohabits’ with the elected parliament but has assumed all legislative functions. 
In two subsequent elections, for the governors of  the federal states in October 2017 and the 
mayors of  the municipalities in December 2017, the PSUV again achieved victories. The 
MUD was divided on participation, and Maduro won 19 of  the 23 seats, and surprisingly 
obtained a (disputed) majority in states where even Chávez was defeated at the height of 
his popularity, although the opposition considers these elections as flawed. In the municipal 
elections of  December 2017, only some of  the MUD parties presented candidates. With 
a turnout of  only 47% of  the electorate, Maduro won 300 of  the 335 municipalities, even 
in the principal districts of  Caracas, recently seen as an opposition city. In May 2018, 
with a turnout of  46%, and with the MUD parties again boycotting, Maduro won the 
presidential elections with 68% of  the votes, his closest challenger oppositional ‘Chavista’ 
candidate Falcón, who won 21%. In January 2019, Juan Gaidó, president of  the parliament, 
declared himself  interim president disputing the legitimacy of  both Maduro’s presidency 
and the Constituent Assembly. The country has again two presidents in one country, but 
not exactly what Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez had intended.
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The Venezuelan armed forces under Maduro
After Maduro’s inauguration, civilian ministries and management functions were 
increasingly transferred to the military. Active or retired military officers occupied 
key cabinet positions; and important sectors and strategic public instruments, like tax 
collection, budgeting, public contracts and tendering, purchases and acquisitions in the 
public sector, public imports, and control of  the public banks are also managed by military 
officers (Tablante & Tarre, 2015; Ramos Pismarato, 2018). 
Under Chávez, the FANB were already a powerful instrument, acting as both the right 
(defence and internal security) and left hand (in charge of  ministries, missions and 
economic management) of  the president. However, Chávez’s charisma was undisputed 
and he maintained control by annual appointments of  new senior commanders, resulting 
in career mobility of  more junior officers.2 He also rewarded loyalty with promotion, 
thus creating a system of  rank inflation within the armed forces. Some recently retired 
high-ranking senior commanding officers estimate the number of  generals (and their 
equivalents in the navy, air force and national guard) at 700.3 
At present, the armed forces still act as both the defence and management, and control and 
repression forces of  the ruling government. Maduro also developed a new mass promotion 
programme to reward loyalty. On 5 July 2018, the Independence Day of  Venezuela, 
Maduro promoted 183 officers to general or admiral (El País, 2018), and topped up the 
salaries of  the officers’ corps, so that in terms of  national salary scales in the public sector, 
an army colonel earns 15 times more than a university professor. During the 20th century, 
Venezuelan ministers of  defence could be either a civilian or a high-ranking military officer, 
but under Chávez, 12 loyal senior military officers were appointed first as commander-in-
chief  of  the armed forces, and subsequently as minister of  defence. 
Maduro extended this system of  selecting only fierce ‘Chavista’ military loyalists, such as 
General Vladimir Padrino, who was commander-in-chief  in 2013, and was made minister 
of  defence in 2014. Confronted with political mayhem and economic calamity, Maduro 
issued an ‘emergency economic decree’ in July 2016, creating a ‘sovereign and safe supply’ 
of  food and goods, to be headed by his minister of  defence. Padrino appointed 24 flag 
officers as section heads: for rice, fruits, chickens, beans, etc., and because food provision is 
politically vital in present-day Venezuela, the military effectively controls the government 
and the ministers. Large-scale corruption within the armed forces is a common research 
topic in the academic and journalistic fields, and according to information published in 
El País (2018), in the first half  of  2018 the Ministry of  Defence received 35% more budget 
than the Ministry of  Education, and 17 times more than the Ministry of  Agriculture. 
General Padrino is now in charge of  national defence and management of  the national 
economy, at the same time overseeing all other social missions, acting as a kind of  super-
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premier, and the armed forces oversee 51% of  the entire national budget (Transparencia 
Venezuela, 2017:7; Jácome, 2018). In November 2017, Maduro appointed the commander 
of  the National Guard, General Manuel Quevedo (another loyal ‘Chavista’), as both the 
Oil Minister and as president of  the PDVSA, the state-owned industrial complex of  oil 
enterprises on which the Venezuelan economy is so dependent. Consequently, senior 
military members are strongly intertwined with government. In the present (September 
2018) 32-member cabinet, 12 members are military, controlling the most vital positions: 
Defence, Interior, Justice, Alimentation, Housing, Public Works, Transport, and Electricity. 
The close collaboration between Cuba and Venezuela in terms of  intelligence and 
state security has been consolidated (Trinkunas, 2005; Ramos Pismarato, 2008; Ramos 
Pismataro, Francesca & Andrés Otálvaro, 2008; Jácome, 2011; Sánchez Medero, 2014; 
Strønen, 2016; Giacalone, 2017). Cuban assistance and training have strongly influenced 
the military defence strategy, as well as the ideology of  high-ranking officers of  the armed 
forces, and the intelligence and counterintelligence services in their efforts to ‘control 
external and internal threats’ ( Jácome, 2017). Civilian, military and political intelligence 
tend to overlap, and the distinction between the functions and operations of  the Servicio 
Bolivariano de Inteligencia Nacional (National Intelligence Service, SEBIN), the Dirección 
General de Inteligencia Militar (Military Intelligence, DGIM) and the Dirección General 
de Contrainteligencia Militar (Military Counterintelligence, DGCIM) is unclear in practice 
(Ramos Pismataro, 2018:268). 
Conclusions
On 3 May 2018, President Maduro published a page-long article in El País, arguing that 
Venezuela’s democracy is quite different from all others, ‘Because all others – in practically 
all other countries of  the world – are democracies created by and for the elites … class 
based democracies … For us, the essence of  our democracy is that the economy serves 
the people and not [that] the people are at the service of  the economy … For us … the 
economy is justice and democracy, protection.’ 
The declaration is hopeful, but less encouraging is the phenomenon of  growing autocracy, 
and militarisation of  the economy, society and political structures. Less hopeful, too, is the 
hyperinflation and mass emigration, not only by the elites and upper-middle classes, but 
by poor people arriving at refugee camps and bivouacs in other Latin American countries 
at the mercy of  perhaps distant family members or former Venezuelan refugees, other 
people with compassion, or foreign governments overwhelmed by the sheer volume of 
the continuing migration stream. 
Venezuela’s democracy is based on an alliance between the elites of  a political party 
and the military establishment, supported by a core of  roughly 30% of  the electorate. 
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However, in general, military institutions have a better life-expectancy than political parties, 
political careers and political leaders. At present (September 2018), the political fate of  the 
president is largely dependent on the loyalty of  his military supporters, while Venezuela 
is a house divided, economically and politically. The military sustains the president and 
oversees a large part of  governing the country and managing the economy. But what 
if  the Venezuelan economic and political crisis grows deeper, the protest movements 
become more desperate, and the armed forces, instead of  loyal supporters, feel the need 
to become the national arbiter?
With two conflicting parliaments, a serious national division, an economy in hyperinflation, 
a failed refinancing of  foreign debt, and rapid impoverishment of  a considerable part of 
the population, the future of  the country is depressing. In the near future, Venezuela’s 
stormy years may turn into a hurricane.
Notes
1 Carlos Lage quoted in Pérez Marcano and Sánchez García (2007:176) and Hugo Chávez quoted in 
Martínez Heredia (2010:79).
2 Traditionally, the general commanders of  the four branches have the highest seniority. If  a more 
junior commander is appointed, all higher-ranking officers are invited to retirement.
3 Author’s interviews in November 2017 in Caracas.
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